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ARE (AMERICAN) SECESSIONISTS NECESSARILY
REVOLUTIONARIES?
SANFORD LEVINSON*
I begin with a difference of opinion and nomenclature with my very
close friend and pervasive intellectual influence, Mark Graber. We were
teaching a course together by Zoom during the spring semester of 2021 at the
University of Texas Law School on constitutional issues related to the great
events of 1860–18__?, i.e., Secession, Civil War, and Reconstruction.1 The
question I want to address is how exactly we describe secession in terms of
the overall topic of this year’s schmooze: constitutional revolutions. Our
answer may also have implications for exactly how we respond to statues of
Robert E. Lee or even, perhaps, exactly how we respond to the image of the
Confederate Battle Flag being brought into the United States Capitol. To put
it mildly, the topic could easily support a full-fledged book; instead, my
contribution here will be little more than a slightly long op-ed, designed far
more to raise the issue than to come close to providing a fully-argued
resolution.
Before turning to the events of 1860–61, though, I want to specify the
argument that Mark and I are having concerning an earlier event in American
history. Most people refer to the period of 1776–83 as “the American
Revolution.” Inspired by Harvard historian David Armitage, who has written
an authoritative study of the Declaration of Independence as a worldhistorical document,2 I increasingly refer to the actions justified by the
Declaration as “the American secession from the British Empire.”3 Unlike,
say, the political theorist Danielle Allen, who emphasizes the Declaration’s
theme of “equality” (which surely is there),4 I read it primarily as setting out
© 2021 Sanford Levinson.
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1. The question mark, which is not the topic of this paper, simply acknowledges the fact that
there is a fascinating and important debate about the ending of the “First Reconstruction.”
2. DAVID ARMITAGE, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A GLOBAL HISTORY (2007).
See also DAVID ARMITAGE, CIVIL WARS: A HISTORY IN IDEAS (2017) [hereinafter ARMITAGE,
CIVIL WARS]; David Armitage, Secession and Civil War, in SECESSION AS AN INTERNATIONAL
PHENOMENON: FROM AMERICA’S CIVIL WAR TO CONTEMPORARY SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS 37
(Don H. Doyle ed., 2010) [hereinafter Armitage, Secession and Civil War].
3. See Armitage, Secession and Civil War, supra note 2; ARMITAGE, CIVIL WARS, supra note
2.
4. DANIELLE ALLEN, OUR DECLARATION: A READING OF THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE IN DEFENSE OF EQUALITY (2014).
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the argument that “one people” can, when dissatisfied, simply “alter [and]
. . . abolish” their terms of governance,5 which includes withdrawal from an
existing polity. That is the meaning of government by “consent of the
governed.”6 That announcement of a desire for what might be called a
political divorce is certainly disappointing to the existing political regime; it
will, no doubt, castigate the would-be seceders as “traitors,” “terrorists,” or
“revolutionaries.” Supporters of the secessionists will certainly have a
different perspective. One issue, therefore, is whether these terms have any
genuine analytic meaning or are instead merely terms of political invective
that should not, perhaps for that reason, be taken entirely seriously by
academics.
The Declaration can be read in two quite distinct ways. One is simply
to emphasize the “Right of the People to alter or to abolish” any existing form
of government whenever they believe that a new form would be “most likely
to effect their Safety and Happiness.”7 To put it mildly, this seems to give a
great deal of latitude to would be transformationists, whatever we choose to
call them. But, of course, that paragraph concludes with the assertion that
Great Britain, and its King, have been guilty of “a long train of abuses,” and
the rest of the Declaration—the bulk of the document—sets out the bill of
particulars justifying withdrawal from the Empire.8 That being said,
surprisingly little turns on this, unless one believes, as do many contemporary
political theorists, that secession is legitimate if and only if one is being
oppressed.9 Whatever the rhetorical (and political) importance of setting out
the purported “abuses” visited upon the colonists, the heart of the “American”
argument, I would argue, is its emphasis on popular assent to any given
government. “Prudence” has dictated waiting until the colonists couldn’t
stand it anymore, but, presumably, one has the right to “alter [and]
. . . abolish”10 whenever that is thought conducive to public happiness.
One might well treat this as a “revolutionary doctrine.” No
constitutional order can truly tolerate it as a legitimate possibility in terms of
the instability it would necessarily produce if significant elements of the
population took the Declaration’s arguments seriously. It is not surprising
that successful leaders of national liberation struggles, whether defined as

5. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Allen Buchanan, Theories of Secession, 26 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 31, 34–35 (1997).
For a distinctly contrasting view, see TIMOTHY WILLIAM WATERS, BOXING PANDORA:
RETHINKING BORDERS, STATES, AND SECESSION IN A DEMOCRATIC WORLD (2020).
10. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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revolutionaries or secessionists, try almost immediately to tamp down any
such impulses among their population.
But, and here is the basis of the argument between Mark and myself, the
American “patriots” were not trying to overthrow the existing British
government in London. We can meaningfully refer to the English
“revolutionaries” of the 1640s inasmuch as they indeed were devoted to the
violent overthrow of the existing system of government—manifested most
memorably in the regicide of King Charles I—and its replacement by a brand
new system. That was also true of the French revolutionaries, who similarly
executed King Louis XVI. Ditto for the Russian revolutionaries of 1917,
who also killed the Czar and his family along the way of completely
overthrowing the existing framework of government.
The Americans, however, were content to leave the British Empire as it
was; what remained after the American secession would continue to be
governed by the King and Parliament. The American insurgents did destroy
a statue of King George III that had graced what is now downtown
Manhattan, but he was otherwise not the target of actual attempts on his life
or well-being.
Nor, whatever the world-historical importance of the actions by the
Americans, were they presenting themselves as the vanguard of a movement
aspiring to take over the world. To be sure, attempts were made to enlist
Quebec in the secessionist enterprise—though, interestingly enough, not the
British “upper Canada”—to no avail even though Benedict Arnold led an
army of American troops into Quebec to press the case. The French
revolutionaries were far more ambitious, especially after the revolution was
taken over by Napoleon, who invaded all of Europe and even Egypt.
Of course, 1776 was not the only secessionist episode in early American
history. Vermont had seceded from New York and New Hampshire, a
development that neither of the states was willing to recognize even as both
endorsed the Declaration of Independence and the importance of “consent of
the governed.”11 Vermont would gladly have joined the new “United States
of America” announced in the Declaration, but their 1777 application for
membership in effect was vetoed. New York and New Hampshire finally
accepted the situation, and Vermont did enter the Union in 1791.12 But,
obviously, the most important secession movement following 1787 occurred
in 1860–61.
Did that constitute a “revolution,” either in terms of a professed aim to
take over the American government in general or, more to the point, even
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., Peter S. Onuf, State-Making in Revolutionary America: Independent Vermont as
a Case Study, 67 J. AM. HIST. 797, 797 (1981).
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self-consciously disaffirming the strictures of the United States Constitution?
Both are important, the first especially to Armitage, but the second as well to
anyone grappling with the topic of the schmooze, constitutional revolution,
as a lawyer (and not only an historian or political scientist). Consider this
excerpt from Jefferson Davis’s inaugural address upon assuming the
presidency of the provisional government of the Confederate States of
America on February 18, 1861:
The right solemnly proclaimed at the birth of the United States, and
which has been solemnly affirmed and reaffirmed in the Bill of
Rights of the States subsequently admitted into the Union of 1789,
undeniably recognizes in the people the power to resume the
authority delegated for the purposes of government. Thus the
sovereign States here represented have proceeded to form this
Confederacy; and it is by abuse of language that their act has been
denominated a revolution.13
Consider as well the inscription carved into the side of the monument to the
Confederate war dead that is literally the first thing one sees when
approaching the Texas State Capitol from the South:
DIED FOR STATE RIGHTS GUARANTEED UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION.
THE PEOPLE OF THE SOUTH, ANIMATED BY THE SPIRIT
OF 1776, TO PRESERVE THEIR RIGHTS, WITHDREW FROM
THE FEDERAL COMPACT IN 1861.
THE NORTH
RESORTED TO COERCION. THE SOUTH, AGAINST
OVERWHELMING NUMBERS AND RESOURCES, FOUGHT
UNTIL EXHAUSTED.14
It was, presumably, important to Davis that he not be considered a
“revolutionary” or, even more so, a “traitor” to the oath that he had taken as
a graduate of West Point, a United States Senator, and Secretary of War of
the United States of America. One might say the same, of course, about the
equally distinguished Robert E. Lee. They, presumably, considered
themselves to be principled devotees of the United States Constitution and
the Declaration of Independence, resisting adversaries who in fact did not
have a correct understanding of these foundational documents.
After all, both Madison and Jefferson endorsed in 1798 the “compact”
theory of the Union by which its creators were not a national “people,” but,
rather, the “sovereign states” that retained important aspects of their
13. Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederate States, Inaugural Address of the President of
the Provisional Government, reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM pt. 1,
at 156–57 (Mark A. Graber and Howard Gillman eds., 2018) (emphasis added).
14. See, e.g., the top image on the page in SANFORD LEVINSON, WRITTEN IN STONE: PUBLIC
MONUMENTS IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 49 (2d ed. 2018).
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sovereignty. Its adherents argued that the ultimate implication was not only
“nullification,” as argued by John C. Calhoun, but more importantly,
secession if the terms of the compact were flagrantly violated. It was this
theory that the Texas statue is evoking when defending its “withdr[awal]
from the federal compact.”15 As argued explicitly in the South Carolina
“Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify the
Secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union” on December 24, 1860,
a number of South Carolina’s sister states had behaved in a decidedly
nonfamilial manner by “enact[ing] laws which either nullify the Acts of
Congress [regarding fugitive slaves] or render useless any attempt to execute
them.”16 The question is not whether one believes that Madison and
Jefferson—and their later, more hotheaded followers—were “correct” and
that they successfully defeated all competing theories. And, most certainly,
one does not have to agree that this failure to enforce the justifiably hated
Fugitive Slave laws is analogous to the “long train of abuses”17 charged
against the “tyrannical” George III and his government. Instead, it is whether
one credits the Confederates as having a “thinkable” theory of the
Constitution that would, for example, survive a Rule Eleven motion under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which bans “frivolous” arguments.
The Constitution of 1787 is silent with regard to the possibility of states
doing to the United States what the colonies did to the British Empire in 1776:
withdraw from the Union in the name of the existing constitutional order
itself. The Declaration must be read together with a variety of arguments,
plausible or not,18 made by “Patriot” lawyers that the British Parliament did
not have the authority to impose taxes on the American settlers. As political
theorist and historian Eric Nelson has demonstrated, some of these “Patriots,”
including Alexander Hamilton, were disappointed that George III did not
exercise his theoretical power to veto “unconstitutional” legislation by
Parliament.19 They had, apparently, not received the memo that the nature of
the British constitution had irrevocably been changed in what we often call
the “Glorious Revolution” of 1688. This meant, among other things, that
Parliament had indeed become sovereign, as a practical matter, and that the

15. See id. On Calhoun’s theories, see the interesting letter published in the July 23, 1861
edition of the New York Times. Letter from a Granddaughter of Charles Carroll to the Hon. Edward
Everett, reprinted in John C. Calhoun a Secessionist, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 1861),
https://www.nytimes.com/1861/07/23/archives/john-c-calhoun-a-secessionist.html.
16. See 5 THE COMPLETE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM, pt. 1, supra note 13, at 70–72.
17. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
18. Or perhaps we should realize that the right term is “plausible to whom.”
19. As for the critique of parliamentary power, see, for example, THOMAS JEFFERSON, A
SUMMARY
VIEW
OF
THE
RIGHTS
OF
BRITISH
AMERICA
(1774),
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/jeffsumm.asp.
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powers exercised by Stuart monarchs were simply no longer available, even
though Queen Anne did veto a bill involving the Scottish Militia in 1708.
But, of course, that was almost seventy years prior to the colonists’
complaints about the reticence of George III in the face of purported
Parliamentary overreach, and the British constitution had in fact changed
irrevocably toward a far more Whig understanding of an empowered
legislature and a diminished monarch, even if George III remained on the
throne with more power, say, than Queen Elizabeth II now has. Perhaps one
can understand why so many lawyers and, most certainly, Crown-appointed
judges retained their loyalty to Great Britain, for they viewed the “American”
arguments as legally fallacious, if not, indeed, preposterous. “We,”
presumably, as loyal Americans who wish to valorize the heroes of 1776,
have a different view!
So, doing a fast forward to the America of 1860, are we really prepared
to say that the secessionist arguments presented by Davis and other adherents
of the Confederacy, many of them careful lawyers, were necessarily “anticonstitutional” and therefore “revolutionary” (or, at least, insurrectionist)? If
one looks at this only through the blinkered eyes of the lawyer, were Davis’s
arguments necessarily worse than those of Jefferson and other great
“patriots” of American independence? Or is it possible that reflection would
force us to concede that they were thoroughly plausible, even if not (to us)
convincing, arguments that were well within the American constitutional
tradition, whether dated from 1775–76 or even 1787? Might we not concede
the validity of the premise that the Civil War was fought between adherents
of two plausibly contending theories of the Constitution itself and not,
therefore, between one side upholding the “true Constitution” and the other
that was its enemy.
What would it mean truly to accept this view of the matter? One
possibility is that it is a mistake to describe Davis and Lee simply as “traitors”
and to advocate, say, taking down their monuments because they committed
“treason.” Instead, one might support removing their monuments, as I do,
because of the substantive values to which they were committed—doing
“whatever it took” to maintain a vicious and indefensible system of chattel
slavery, symbolized, among other ways, by the truly vicious fugitive slave
laws. The Texas statue may evoke the anodyne theory of state compact, but
the February 2, 1861 “declaration of the causes which impel the State of
Texas to secede from the Federal Union” speaks with a ruthlessly admirable
clarity that secession was provoked by an absolute commitment to white
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supremacy and maintaining chattel slavery.20 To be sure, the more we focus
on the substantive values underlying secession—and base our views of Davis
and Lee on the fact that they were committed to an evil regime—the more
we must in fact confront the grim possibility that the 1787 Constitution itself
was, as William Lloyd Garrison suggested, “a covenant with death, and an
agreement with hell.”21 And recall that Garrison preceded Davis in calling
for secession and “No Union with Slaveholders.”22
So, what exactly would we think if, contrary to fact, Garrison had been
successful and, say, New England had attempted to secede in the aftermath
of the “Compromise of 1850” and then the repeal of the Missouri
Compromise in the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854? Would we view him and
his supporters as “traitors”? Would we join Lincoln in proclaiming the
necessity, as loyal American constitutionalists, of remaining within a Union
that required, among other things, complying with the Fugitive Slave Act of
1850 and, in effect, being political quietists with regard to abolishing slavery
in the states where it already existed? And, of course, lurking behind the
curtain in any such discussion is John Brown, who repudiated Garrison’s own
commitment to non-violence.23 Is he a hero, a villain, or simply a madman
in believing that his foolhardy action at Harper’s Ferry might in fact bring
about abolition (as one might even suggest it did, though in a very different
way from what he imagined)?
I have no particular brief for the Texas statue, which I would gladly
remove from the Capitol grounds inasmuch as its placement there might
mislead impressionable viewers into believing that it expresses the one “true”
theory of secession and war. But I do suggest that it is much too facile to say
simply that it bespeaks a necessarily “wrong” view of the constitutional order
“ordained” in 1787 and, for Lincoln and others, founded in the great ideals
of the Declaration of Independence, which included political selfdetermination. To be sure, it is hard, perhaps impossible, to read the
Declaration as endorsing or even protecting chattel slavery. But it is equally
20. Declaration of Causes: February 2, 1861, A Declaration of the Causes Which Impel the
State of Texas to Secede from the Federal Union., TEX. ST. LIBR. & ARCHIVES COMM’N,
https://www.tsl.texas.gov/ref/abouttx/secession/2feb1861.html (last modified Aug. 25, 2011).
21. See Donald Yacovone, “A Covenant with Death and an Agreement with Hell,” MASS. HIST.
SOC’Y (July 2005), https://www.masshist.org/object-of-the-month/objects/a-covenant-with-deathand-an-agreement-with-hell-2005-07-01.
22. Paul Finkelman, Garrison’s Constitution: The Covenant with Death and How It Was Made,
PROLOGUE
MAG.
(Winter
2000),
https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2000/winter/garrisons-constitution-1.html.
23. There is, of course, copious literature on John Brown. The latest entrant is H.W. Brands,
THE ZEALOT AND THE EMANCIPATOR (2020). One of the classic biographies that captures the
essence of Brown in its title is STEPHEN B. OATES, TO PURGE THIS LAND WITH BLOOD: A
BIOGRAPHY OF JOHN BROWN (2d ed. 1984).
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hard, if not impossible, to read the secession that it was defending, and then
far more certainly the Constitution that followed, as not fundamentally
preservative of slavery and thus creating what Don Fehrenbacher called the
“slaveholding republic.”24 Just as it is far more satisfying, ideologically, to
denounce Roger Taney and his opinion in Dred Scott as the work product of
what Jack Balkin and I have termed a “judge[] on a rampage”25 than to
address the possibility that it was a thoroughly “respectable” piece of legal
craft26 whatever its iniquitous holdings, so is it more satisfying to assert
without further argument that Davis and his secessionist colleagues were
“traitors” than honest and sincere “constitutionalists” holding views that we
profoundly (and correctly) disagree with and regard as abhorrent.
American academics are engaged these days in a great civil war
themselves, between adherents of the 1619 Project27 and critics like Princeton
Professor Sean Wilentz and others,28 not to mention, of course, the right-wing
ideologues appointed by President Trump who crafted the “1776 Report”29
in the waning days of the preceding Administration. Proponents of the 1619
Project root American history, including its constitutional history, in an
unrelenting past (and present) of maintaining white supremacy. Wilentz and
James Oakes correctly point to the existence of a strain of “anti-slavery”
constitutionalism. Wilentz, in particular, builds his entire argument around
a comment by James Madison that the Constitution did not in its text
recognize “property in men.”30 They are scarcely Panglosses about American
history, but they certainly want to present a more optimistic reading than does
Nicole Hannah-Jones, the principal author behind the 1619 Project. But the
24. DON FEHRENBACHER, THE SLAVEHOLDING REPUBLIC: AN ACCOUNT OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT’S RELATIONS TO SLAVERY (Ward M. McAfee ed., 2001).
25. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Thirteen Ways of Looking at Dred Scott, 82 CHI.KENT L. REV. 49, 78 (2007).
26. See generally MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL
EVIL (2006).
27. The
1619
Project,
N.Y.
TIMES
MAG.
(Aug.
14,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/1619-america-slavery.html.
28. For a good overview of the controversy, see Adam Serwer, The Fight Over the 1619 Project
Is
Not
About
the
Facts,
ATLANTIC
(Dec.
23,
2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/12/historians-clash-1619-project/604093/.
29. PRESIDENT’S
ADVISORY
1776
COMM’N,
THE
1776
REPORT
(2021),
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/The-Presidents-Advisory1776-Commission-Final-Report.pdf. The “advisors” were uniformly right wing and presented what
almost all professional historians believe to be a distinctly distorted (and unduly optimistic) view of
American history with regard to slavery. The language of the Declaration, for example, is taken to
be truly constitutive of American political identity and the grim reality of chattel slavery treated
basically as epiphenomenal, doomed to extinction. It should be noted that this report was almost
instantly repudiated by the incoming Biden Administration.
30. SEAN WILENTZ, NO PROPERTY IN MAN: SLAVERY AND ANTISLAVERY AT THE NATION’S
FOUNDING 3 (2018).
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existence of an “anti-slavery” reading of the Constitution does not in the least
gainsay the proposition that there is also, and perhaps more easily, a “proslavery” interpretation of the document and the ensuing “tradition.” The
authors of the 1776 Report basically deny the possibility that a reasonable
person might read the Constitution as did Davis, Lee, and the Sons of the
Confederacy who put up the Texas monument in 1901, with the avid support
of the then-governor of Texas who threatened to thrash anyone who denied
the validity of what has been labeled the “lost cause” theory of the War. That
seems to me a mistake.
William Faulkner’s statement—“The past is never dead. It’s not even
past”—has, for better or worse, become a cliché.31 But that does not make it
wrong. We have never genuinely come to terms with the events of 1860–61
(or, perhaps, even of 1776), in terms either of the social realities underlying
them or, more importantly for our particular and perhaps parochial purposes,
of the deep constitutional issues presented by the arguments made by
proponents of secession. To continue to dismiss Davis and Lee simply as
“traitors” instead of as men who were both deeply devoted to their
understanding of the United States Constitution and, more importantly, to a
truly evil political cause, will not, I am afraid, further our understanding of
the complexities underlying a commitment to the Constitution of 1787 or,
perhaps, to its maintenance today. It is not simply that one person’s terrorist
is another person’s freedom fighter. Rather, it may be the case that one
person’s “revolutionary” is another person’s “faithful adherent to the
Constitution.” Are we truly confident that we possess an adequate theory of
the Constitution, separable from our raw political views, that can tell us with
confidence exactly who is which?

31. WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR A NUN (1951).

